Location: n-ost media hub, Alexandrinenstraße 2-3, Berlin
The talk will offer insights into the role of the Georgian diaspora in Germany and Europe, as well as the influence of Russian propaganda on media and elections. We will also explore how these issues resonate within Germany and Europe, highlighting their implications for democratic values across Eastern Europe.
Join our discussion with
Gaga Gogoladze (GZA, Georgisches Zentrum im Ausland)
Luka Bluashvili (Formula TV)
Luke Johnson (Freelance Journalist)
Moderated by Karin Finkenzeller (Freelance Journalist)
Background and context
“With dignity to Europe” boasted the main claim of the hostile election campaign of the governing Georgian Dream party. Another set of posters showed – to the appalment of many Georgians – images of Ukrainian cities, schools, sport halls and churches destroyed by Russia’s war of aggression, contrasted with peaceful Georgian cities and shingly new infrastructure. In the bleak reality, however, Georgian Dream, populist party founded and de facto led by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili who made his fortune in nineties’ Russia, has been systematically steering Georgia back into Moscow’s arms since the party came to power in 2012. Earlier this year, the government tightened their grip on the overwhelmingly pro-European population and its civil society by hastily ramming Russian-inspired “foreign agent” and “anti-queer propaganda” laws (as well as legal amendments eliminating taxes on offshore assets brought into Georgia) through the parliament despite massive protests.
By all predictions, the incumbent Georgian Dream was poised to gain the largest share of votes, but ahead of the 26 October elections, which were widely framed as a referendum between the EU and Russia and felt as existential for both sides, the opposition was hopeful for a collective victory. The opposition parties formed several coalitions and all signed the Georgian Charter, an agreement initiated by President Salome Zourabishvili which called on signatory parties, if given public mandate, to resolve the political crisis, advance EU integration, and schedule early elections next year in a fair and free environment. As goes a longstanding mantra of Georgian European youth, backed by an ever-growing chorus of vulgar scoffs at the occupier spray painted all over Tbilisi: “Never back to USSR.”
Yet the regions, where many people depend on government-funded jobs, tell a different story than graffitied walls of Sololaki, and stoking fears of war in a country with such horrors within a living memory might have helped Georgian Dream score more points than the opposition expected, with exit polls by two US polling firms projecting a similar share of 41%. What followed a tense election day marred by allegations of fraud was a strange vacuum into which both sides unconvincingly declared victory, including an awkward episode of Viktor Orbán sending his congratulations before the Central Election Committee announced any results. On 27 October, the committee declared the victory of Georgian Dream, claiming the party received 54%. Authoritarian rulers and Kremlin propagandists rushed with their best wishes, while the opposition declared the elections to be stolen and refused to accept the result, supported by evidence of electoral fraud gathered by observer missions and journalists. President called on protests and people came out on the streets in thousands, demanding the annulment of the elections.
But does that help? Georgian Dream has been vocal with deluded talks about punishing the collective opposition. Civil society and independent media are determined to continue the fight, but organisations might be forced to shut operations under the brunt of ridiculous fines when the “Russian laws” are enforced. What other challenges do they face now? What is the role of the outgoing President? What is the role and responsibility of the West? How did German and international media report on Georgia over the last 12 years of Georgian Dream rule?