Who are the assassins who kill Russian war criminals and Ukrainian traitors?

Ukrainian article of the week published in the 62nd edition of the "What about Ukraine" newsletter on January 23rd, 2025. The article was written by Majya Orel for hromadske and was translated for n-ost by Natalia Volynets. Find the original article in Ukrainian here.

Photo credit: hromadske

How much does a contract killer charge for assassinating a senior Russian politician, spy or military leader?

Volodymyr Zhemchugov, an organiser of the Ukrainian resistance movement in the Russian-occupied Luhansk region, gives details to hromadske.

He states that “a Russian killer” murdered the former Ukrainian MP and supporter of the Russian full scale invasion, Illia Kyva, for a fee of 50,000 USD in 2023.

Zhemchugov adds that the killer of Russian lieutenant general Igor Kirillov, who was blown up in Moscow in December 2024, came with a price of 100,000 USD.

“We don’t invite professionals from faraway places to work in Russia,” he says. “They are hardly aware of Russian realities and can swiftly come under the attention of the FSB. We’re looking for people from post-Soviet countries. For good money, they are ready to take our revenge.”

Zhemchugov talks about the work of operatives for Ukraine, their successes and failures, the price list for their services, and their ideological beliefs. He also discusses whether we can hope for the assassination of former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych, former Russian minister of defence Sergei Shoigu, or Putin himself.

In this conversation, we do not disclose data that is secret or might harm Ukraine’s defence capabilities.

A mercenary is just another profession

Reporter: Who carries out Ukraine’s special operations against the Russians and traitors to Ukraine?

Volodymyr Zhemchugov (VZ): On the territory of Russia, I would divide these people into three categories.

The first one are mercenaries interested in nothing but money. We hire them, in particular, through their Internet, via specialised websites where they offer their services or respond to our offers. They fulfil the order, get the money, and that’s it.

The second category include former career officers of the Russian army and secret services.

And the third one are the residents of the territory where the respective special operation is planned: ordinary people are ready to set fire to a railway communications box for RUB 20,000 (193 euros).

Reporter: What about career officers of the Ukrainian secret services?

VZ: Already prior to the full-scale war, we stopped sending them to work in the territory of Russia, as these operations involved a great degree of betrayal: Russians arrested our officers literally when they passed through passport control.

With the start of Ukrainian military actions in Kursk, though, our intelligence officers entered Russia together with the special forces. Now, they are building a logistical and communication network to support our special operations throughout the territory of Russia. They have already reached Vladivostok. The transfer of weapons, explosives, and intelligence is part of their duty.

Reporter: Do mercenaries always understand who their customer is and why it is necessary to eliminate a particular individual?

VZ: They can guess by learning who their target is and looking at websites about them. But people working just for money do not care about such information. It is only important for them to know the cost of the order and the location of the objective.

Reporter: Are all such mercenaries professional killers?

VZ: Of course not. They include professional killers from the criminal world, retired officers of the Russian army, and ordinary civilians for whom we organise an appropriate training course, and we provide them with weapons and ammunition.

Modern explosive devices are quite simple. [To understand how it works] a video a few minutes long with instructions is recorded, and the contractor is given the equipment and decides. To attach a bomb and remotely detonate this is nothing complicated. There are two or three buttons: one on the explosive to activate it, and two on the remote control.

Reporter: Who are the civilian mercenaries?

VZ: They are different people. For example, the commander of the Russian submarine ‘Krasnodar’ Stanislav Rzhitsky, was shot dead in Sochi by a Ukrainian who had previously moved to Russia due to family circumstances, and took part in the operation on his own initiative.

These can also be people who really need money, which they cannot earn in any other way. They are also people from the criminal world and those who once even fought against Ukraine. Plus they can be alcohol and drug addicts, pupils and students.

Reporter: Should we disregard the moral aspect when selecting operatives?

VZ: We aim for results, and drug addicts can turn out to be the most effective [at achieving this]. They need money for their next fix. Of course, they are not suitable for shooting down pilots who bomb civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. But they will set fire to a recruitment office or cargo on a railway, and for a relatively low cost of RUB 5,000–10,000 (50 to 100 euros), and sometimes RUB 50,000 (500 euros).

Reporter: How reliable are drug addicts and alcoholics as operatives?

VZ: I do not remember drug addicts ever turning us in. To get a dose, they become an honest party to agreements, and we keep them on the hook. Meanwhile, alcoholics and young people are less reliable. They can betray us out of fear, especially young Russians. We have hardly had time to train them, and have provided only concise instructions, for we had to organise a continuous massive flow of arson attacks on Russian communications and recruitment offices

Besides, we were sure that the war would end soon and nothing would happen to these guys. We were wrong. Now, we pay young Russians more money than drug addicts — sometimes up to 20,000 USD.

Reporter: Who sets the price for operatives?

VZ: There is a market for certain services setting these rates. Generally, the pay for a specific order is determined during preliminary communication with the operative. There is a starting amount, and then a negotiation.

Reporter: Is Ukraine bound by any financial limitations in these operations?

VZ: No. Since 2014, we have eliminated about three dozen Russian generals. Ukraine, a victim of aggression, can’t economise on such things.

Reporter: Are mercenaries paid only on completion of the task?

VZ: There are different cases. If we have confidence in the operative, they can receive up to ten percent in advance.

Reporter: Can the Russian side fake the assassination of one of our enemies?

VZ: In some instances, the Russian secret services found out about the preparation of a special operation or the operative went to the FSB and betrayed us. The operative would “stage” the assassination, take pictures of the “dead” person, and we would pay the mercenary. But these are one-off cases. It is impossible to protect ourselves against them: conducting special operations is like roulette — everything can move from success to failure at the last moment. 

A bomb for the general: triggered by a phonecall

Reporter: When eliminating a war criminal and collaborator, is a bullet or an explosive device preferred?

VZ: In the occupied territories, we are currently working only with explosives. A killer with handheld guns - small arms - is a highly professional person, such as a special forces officer or a criminal. We currently have few such people. We do not risk them, and keep them for exclusive cases. Some assassinations need just a hammer, but you cannot get close enough to a Russian officer to break his skull or shoot him with a pistol.

Reporter: When our mercenary wants to leave the Russian territory after the action, do we help them?

VZ: We support those who are ideologically motivated. Still, they do not always know how to use our help. Take a story that happened in the Russian republic of Tatarstan. At one of the oil refineries, we found an ethnic Ukrainian who had long ago gained Russian citizenship. He was supposed to put a bomb at his workplace. After that, he had to take a train to the Russian-Kazakh border and cross it. We even bought him a ticket for the train.

The bomb exploded, he reached the border, where the Russian secret services caught up with him. They figured out which employees of the oil refinery could have laid the bomb in such a place, and began to check each of them. They came to our agent’s home, but the apartment was empty and there were no belongings. They put him on the wanted list and border guards detained him at the checkpoint to Kazakhstan.

There are huge areas on the Russian-Kazakh border that are not guarded by anyone, but this person went to an official checkpoint, which was our failure, and his.

Reporter: Each assassination is a separate success story. What helped eliminate general Igor Kirillov, head of the chemical, biological, and nuclear defence troops of the Russian Armed forces?

VZ: An electric scooter containing a radio-controlled bomb was left near the entrance to the apartment building where the general lived. This could be managed by a mobile phone. Our mercenary placed the bomb, activated it, and went away. A video camera was installed in a car nearby, and our man could see everything going on near the entrance online.

When the general came out of the building, the device was detonated from another country by a phone call to the bomb’s mobile number. This ambush was easy to organise as the general lived in an apartment building with no special security measures. The only precaution Kirillov made is that his personal bodyguard was the first to come out of the block. No one paid attention to the scooter.

Russia’s deputy head of the department for mobilisation, Stanislav Rzhytsky, was assassinated because he posted his jogging routes on social networks. He also went running without guards.

Reporter: On 9 December 2024, the head of the Olenivka prison colony, Sergei Yevsyukov, died in a car explosion. On 13 November, a car with the captain of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, Valery Trankovsky, was blown up in Sevastopol. On 7 March, a car belonging to collaborator Olena Iliina-Samoilenko was blown up in Berdiansk, but she survived. Why don’t all explosions ensure assassination?

VZ: This depends on the type of device used and where it is placed. In the case of Trankovsky, for example, it was a magnetic bomb attached to the car body, right under the driver’s seat, and this worked. In other instances, a few centimetres’ difference can decide the operation’s success.

In 2015, I participated in the assassination of the occupying mayor of Krasnyi Luch in Luhansk, Yuriy Kondratenko. A MON-50 mine exploded near his car, with its fragments hitting the bonnet and a wheel — but 50 cm far from the inside. The mayor suffered concussion, but did not die. However, according to partisan standards, such operations are still considered successful.

Reporter: In April 2024, a car with former Ukrainian secret service (SBU) employee Vasyl Prozorov was blown up in Moscow. In October 2024, the so-called former minister of energy of the Luhansk People’s Republic Kostiantyn Zavizenov was found dead in the Moscow region — he died from a gunshot to the head. Is it easier for us to get close to the traitors to Ukraine living on Russian territory?

VZ: It is much easier to track them down [in Russia] than Russian officers in Ukraine. After all, they feel relaxed on Russian territory. They do not check their cars for explosives and do not have personal guards. These are small Russian henchmen, whom even the FSB does not protect. We are watching all these traitors, and their elimination is a matter of time.

Operatives unaware of “full picture” of task

Reporter: How many people are usually involved in preparing an assassination?

VZ: If small arms are used, one person is enough. For example, [Russia-supporting ex-Ukrainian MP] Illia Kyva was eliminated by one man, although other agents established the target’s location.

If a car is blown up, more people are needed. In Sevastopol, when captain Trankovsky was liquidated, one person studied his travel routes and where he parked, the second laid the bomb, and the third detonated it.

Reporter: Do the people involved in the same operation know each other?

VZ: Hardly ever — if they are acquainted with each other, and one of them is caught by the Russian secret services, they might betray the others. People are tortured so much [in Russia], that they reveal everything. So, everyone gets their task from the coordinator, and is often unaware of the general picture of the operation.

Why plans go wrong

Reporter: How often do Russian special services find our operatives?

VZ: Unfortunately, often: Russians capture 60–70 percent of our mercenaries. They are interrogated and tortured. Their usual imprisonment term is 25 years. For [the convicted assassin of Stanislav Rzhitsky] Serhiy Denysenko, for example, the prosecutor asked for 25 years, but he got 20. The Russians do not kill these captives, and keep them for a prisoner exchange with their military personnel or agents. We also include them on lists of prisoners we want to exchange.

Reporter: But the figure is too high — up to 70 percent! Can we train them better?

VZ: It’s difficult. A high-class pilot is trained for ten years. The same applies to a special operations agent — but our work has to be performed today. I believe that in the future, our political and military leadership will draw respective conclusions from this situation.

Reporter: What are the most common reasons for failures?

VZ: The Russians benefit from high professional standards, while our agents suffer from weaknesses due to faults in mobile communications, video cameras in the streets, and personal negligence. A smartphone is an operative’s main assistant, as well as their greatest danger. On a mission to prepare an operation, one should not take their smartphone or should at least remove the batteries from it, as they leave a digital trail.

Russians analyse data from phones used around an explosion epicentre. Then, they work out which mobile numbers relate to people living or working there and which ones were used in this location once or several times. They process this information and identify the operative.

Also, the agent must always take a photo and make a video report of the operation. Sometimes they fail to delete this from their smartphone. Many of our people ended up in Russian torture chambers because of this.

Take the story of our agent Vitaliy Diatlenko, who had to attach a bomb to a car undercarriage. He pretended to slip and fall next to the vehicle, putting the bomb in place in seconds. But it turned out that the FSB had deliberately placed this car under video camera surveillance as a decoy. Vitaliy was identified, and when the special forces came to arrest him in February 2024, he was killed in a fight.

Reporter: Is it possible to figure out the location of a video camera in such a place?

VZ: Usually, cameras are put in crowded places, near the objectives that may be of interest to guerrillas and our agents. In Berdiansk and Zaporizhzhia region, they helped catch many of our people. Now, we do not put bombs on cars in such places, as there is definitely a camera watching.

By the way, it was due to video surveillance that Russians recently arrested the person who blew up the head of the Olenivka prison colony, Sergei Yevsyukov, on 9 December. They recorded and identified the face of our agent. They even posted a video of his arrest. He lived alone and they seized him at home.

In this case, though, the target’s car was not a decoy. The face of our agent was recorded by video surveillance cameras that had long been operating near Yevsyukov’s home. In 2024, Russians installed more than 2,000 such cameras in Donetsk — something our people should also remember.

Reporter: And what did you personally fail in?

VZ: I was supposed to be returning from a mission — I had set a bomb with a timer to blow up the power line of the Luhansk military airfield. During special training, we were taught to return from a mission using the same route we used to get there. To do this, I had to cross a highway. At that time, a column of Russian military vehicles was moving along it.

I just had to wait for them to pass, but I felt too nervous and wanted to be as far away from the airfield as possible. I went to the other side of the highway and entered the old minefield around the airfield. I set off one of the mines, and Russian soldiers found me. So, I violated the instructions.

For Putin, it’s not about money

Reporter: Do people in the temporarily occupied territories help the Armed Forces of Ukraine more for ideological or financial reasons?

VZ: We must distinguish between the long occupied and recently occupied territories, for the situation there is not the same. In the former ones, there are few ideological partisans in combat after the 11 years of war. Most left in 2022 to avoid Russian mobilisation. But there are still many ideological members of the underground movement. They effectively collect information about occupiers’ manoeuvres and locations.

Ninety percent of sabotage actions in the long occupied territories are now performed for money, for example by the citizens of Ukraine serving in occupation administrations or occupation army. Interestingly, the percentage of betrayal is very low among them: if people take money, they do the work.

The recently occupied territories face a 50/50 situation. In 2022, we trained over a thousand agents from local residents in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions. They were supposed to, among other things, eliminate traitors and work with explosives. But most of them were young people and many were captured during 2023.

This again goes back to your question about the reasons for failures. People are lazy, careless, and neglect vigilance and discipline. We did teach them to be vigilant, unlike the Russian young men who became our agents. Russian occupiers have caught Ukrainian operatives at mobile checkpoints: with a mine in a bag, secret information still in their phone, and self-confidence instead of caution.

Reporter: How much do civilians who carry out special operations in the occupied territories earn?

VZ: Up to 10,000 USD. Considering the degree of risk and danger, this is a low rate.

Reporter: How much were you paid working as a guerrilla in the occupied Luhansk region?

VZ: It was 2015, we were official DIU (Defence Intelligence of Ukraine) agents, and for putting a mine at the airfield, we were promised a reward of 500 USD.

Reporter: You said that for the elimination of general Kirillov the assassin received 100,000 USD. Has any mercenary received a larger amount?

VZ: We pay 100,000 USD for the assassination of a war criminal at the general level. Of course, the chief of the general staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Valery Gerasimov, or the minister of defence, Andrei Belousov, would cost more. Unfortunately, we can’t reach them yet, as well as Putin. But I am not saying this is impossible. Modern technologies of combat drones have opened up many opportunities.

Reporter: Can we hope that [former president] Viktor Yanukovych will be eliminated someday?

VZ: I do not think so. We need him alive — to testify against the Putin regime about the start of the war in 2014 and annexation of Crimea in particular. He knows there is no threat to him from the Ukrainian side.