The shooting should not stop

Ukrainian article of the week published in the 52nd edition of the "What about Ukraine" newsletter on November 7th, 2024. The article was written by Pavlo Kazarin for Ukrainska Pravda and was translated for n-ost by Olesia Storozhuk. Find the original article in Ukrainian here.  

The war can be over soon, but only if we lose it.

That's what I think about every time I read about the possibility of military action in Ukraine ending in 2025. That's what I think when journalists start asking for comments regarding potential negotiations with the Russian Federation. That's what I think when the media write about the prospect of holding elections in our country.

The end of the war may be either a triumph or a disaster for Ukraine. Everything comes down to the conditions of this end. If the Ukrainian army liberated several cities every day, hardly anyone would be interested in freezing the military action. Therefore, it is doubtful that, at the peak of their offensive, the Kremlin is ready to start negotiating with Kyiv about anything other than our capitulation.

A second Chechnya

Moscow is the only constant in Ukrainian politics. Russian logic is much more systematic than any domestic zigzagging. The Kremlin views our country as a rebellious province. The maximum goal is dismantling Ukraine's independence and incorporating its territories into the Russian Federation as regions. The minimum task is to deprive us of our sovereignty, and transform Ukraine into another ‘Belarus’.

On 24 February 2022, the Russian president started writing the final chapter in his political biography. Now, any half-measures would be a failure for him. Besides, the Russian president's clock is ticking. In 2015, at the time of the second Minsk agreement, Vladimir Putin was 62. Today, he is 72, and his age is unfavourable for building any decade-long acquisition strategies. He is willing to reach the 'final resolution of the Ukrainian issue' and is unlikely to stretch this process through time.

For the Russian leadership, Ukraine is another Chechnya: an unruly region that must be reclaimed, punished and tamed. The only difference is that Russians recognise the existence of Chechens, which isn't the case with Ukrainians. If Russia wins, our role will be similar to that of the Karelians, deprived of their national identity. Or the role of Buryats, who are on the frontline in the empire's wars. Or the role of Yakuts, where the locals are not allowed to exploit their own mineral resources. Kyiv is unlikely to suggest, in the course of negotiations, anything that would be more tempting for Moscow than implementing one of these scenarios.

The Churchills and the Chamberlains

War-time politicians are like parties in a Mexican standoff, with everyone aiming at each other and waiting to see who will be the first to blink. The narratives of freezing the war may become the factor leading to everyone pulling the trigger. This is because the prospect of a ceasefire provokes the expectation of elections. The expectation of elections launches a political logic. Political logic goes contrary to the country's needs during an invasion.

The war requires responsibility and long-term thinking. However, if Ukraine starts preparing for elections, the criterion for making decisions becomes the popularity of the candidates.

If a country is at war, it is playing a long game. It shapes the policy of mobilising a reserve army. It increases responsibility for violators of this policy. It introduces economically grounded tariffs as part of its import-export policy. It distributes the burdens of war between the front and the home front justly.

If the country is preparing for elections, politicians start fighting in a popularity contest. They promise the impossible, and the unaffordable. In the short term, this show of promises can have an electoral effect. But in the medium term, it can drown the country.

If we are going to finish military action in 2025, it is unreasonable to conduct additional mobilisation of citizens in the army. If we are planning to freeze the situation next year, there is a chance we can reach it without making fundamental changes. If the country's goal is to hold on for another half a year, what is the point of changing anything, and risking a disruption of the status quo in politics?

Moreover, discussions about 'freezing' or 'ceasefire' provoke expectations from the public. Wider society, eager to return to normality, starts inquiring about peace. It’s one thing if the Ukrainian leadership has a solid negotiation framework and firm red lines in discussions with partners and intermediaries; however, it’s a different thing if all that is subject to erosion due to the expectations of wider society. Public demand for peace can, like acid, corrode the contours of the state's negotiating position — all while our enemy is absolutely free from opinions from its own society.

Two Ukraines in one war

By the end of the third year of the full-scale war, two non-intersecting realities have taken shape within our country.

There is a frontline with the army holding the perimeter. There, military action takes place and people put their life at stake. Separation from their family, everyday discomfort, and a high price for mistakes has become the fate of millions of people wearing a uniform. For the last two and a half years, these people have been risking so much, and they have won time for the rest of the country.

Still, for the majority, the war stopped posing an existential threat by the end of 2022. The Ukrainian home front does not live in a fighting country — it lives among war decorations. Of course, there is a risk of a missile or 'Shahed’ strike on a town or village, but statistically, the chance of dying under Russian fire is lower than in a car accident. The war has become background: while it is close, you may never encounter it. Therefore, in the last two and a half years, coming across a representative of military recruitment centres (MRC) has become the only 'violation of normality' for ordinary people.

From the first days of the invasion, the state apparatus has taken the role of a 'sedative'. Every time, it promises the citizens a quick end to the war. Every time, it speaks of the invasion as an incident that will be fixed. Of all the strategies, the current authorities have chosen the 'Don’t look up’ concept, and of all the possible conversations with the country, it chooses those that will bring applause from the audience.

Hence, ordinary people stopped noticing the war. For them, the MRCs are not a consequence of the invasion, but something like evil spirits that randomly kidnap people. At the same time, an ordinary person hopes to gain entry into the ark of exception from conscription for cash. Rumours say it is almost built and still offers free spots.

The irony is that current leadership has always seen communication as its strength — but it is in communication where it has made its most disastrous mistakes. According to its approach, the country is populated by voters rather than citizens. So, while the leadership speaks of the war as something fast-flowing, there is always an illusion that the country will achieve the last kilometre without the people. Our statesmen like to be attractive and, therefore, keep silent about unpopular topics, leaving them to others to pick up. The military, for example.

People in uniforms ended up in the role of Cassandra, predicting the worst. Nobody believes their forecasts, and no one listens to their appeals. The state continues to feed the country with sedatives, and that’s why ordinary people do not react to the irritants. The military live in society’s ‘blind spot’. People think: ‘The military don’t live a normal life, nor allow us to do so”.

Intriguingly, the Russians defined their priorities long ago. They shifted their country onto a war footing and adapted the economy for a long-term fight. They are focused on making the war in the format of ‘either us or them’ and do everything possible to prevent Ukrainians from thinking about the war in such categories.

Therefore, it is worth reminding. We must do one simple thing for the war to end in our favour.

We must not stop shooting.